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Abstract
This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or 
PIT for short). The argument, which I’ll call the extended mind argument against 
phenomenal intentionality, is centered around two claims: the first asserts that some 
source intentional states extend into the environment, while the second maintains 
that no conscious states extend into the environment. If these two claims are correct, 
then PIT is false, for PIT implies that the extension of source intentionality is predi-
cated upon the extension of phenomenal consciousness. The argument is important 
because it undermines an increasingly prominent account of the nature of intention-
ality. PIT has entered the philosophical mainstream and is now a serious contender 
to naturalistic views of intentionality like the tracking theory and the functional role 
theory (Loar 1987, 2003; Searle 1990; Strawson 1994; Horgan and Tienson 2002; 
Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008; Kriegel 2013; Montague 2016; Bordini 2017; Forrest 2017; 
Mendelovici 2018). The extended mind argument against PIT challenges the popu-
lar sentiment that consciousness grounds intentionality.
Keywords Extended mind · Phenomenal intentionality · Extended consciousness · 
Propositional attitudes
This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality the-
sis. The phenomenal intentionality thesis (or “PIT”) claims that source inten-
tionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, where by “source inten-
tionality” I mean states that are the source of intentionality, being intrinsically 
intentional. The argument, which I call the extended mind argument against 
phenomenal intentionality, is centered around two claims: the first asserts that 
some source intentional mental states extend into the environment, while the 
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second maintains that no conscious mental states extend into the environment. 
If these two claims are correct, then PIT is false, for PIT implies that the exten-
sion of source intentionality is predicated upon the extension of phenomenal 
consciousness. Put differently, I submit that the following three propositions, 
when properly understood, constitute an inconsistent triad: (1) the extended 
mind thesis is true, (2) the extended consciousness thesis is false, and (3) PIT 
is true.1 To avoid a contradiction it must be the case that at least one of these 
propositions is false. The argument presented here motivates (1) and (2) in an 
effort to refute (3).
The argument is important because it undermines an increasingly prominent 
account of the nature of intentionality. PIT has entered the philosophical main-
stream and is now a serious contender to naturalistic views of intentionality like 
the tracking theory and the functional role theory (Bordini, 2017; Farkas, 2008; 
Forrest, 2017; Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Kriegel, 2013; Loar, 1987, 2003; Men-
delovici, 2018; Montague, 2016; Pitt, 2004; Searle, 1990; Strawson, 1994). 
The extended mind argument against PIT challenges the popular sentiment that 
intentionality is grounded in consciousness. Notably, this paper aims not to 
prove with certainty that the extended mind argument against PIT is sound but 
rather to show that each premise of the argument is highly plausible given cer-
tain philosophical assumptions about the nature of consciousness and extended 
cognition.
The general structure of the paper is as follows. Section  1 introduces PIT 
and briefly contrasts the view with naturalistic theories of intentionality. Sec-
tion  2 presents the extended mind argument against PIT and describes Clark 
and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind thesis, clarifying that the thesis does not 
tacitly assume the falsity of PIT by presupposing the functional role theory 
of intentionality. Section 3 draws on an argument from Clark (2008), which I 
call the self-stimulating loop argument, to motivate the idea that the extended 
mind thesis is not restricted to dispositional states with derived intentionality 
but includes within its scope some occurrent propositional attitudes with source 
intentionality (i.e. some source intentional states are extended). Section 4 then 
draws on an argument from Chalmers (2018), which I call the direct access 
argument, to substantiate the claim that the extended consciousness thesis is 
false (i.e. no conscious states are extended). The conjunction of these two sub-
arguments functions to undermine PIT by showing that some extended mental 
states possess source intentionality but lack phenomenal consciousness. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
1 The extended consciousness thesis in this context denotes the nonmodal claim that some existing 
conscious states are extended, not the modal claim that conscious mental states can be extended. The 
extended mind thesis is also understood to be a nonmodal claim and is taken to encompass both disposi-
tional states with derived intentionality and occurrent propositional attitudes with source intentionality.
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1  The phenomenal intentionality thesis
The phenomenal intentionality thesis (PIT) is an increasingly popular view in the 
philosophy of mind about the nature of intentionality. Before unpacking the view, 
it will be instructive to distinguish between source intentionality and derived inten-
tionality and introduce the two primary theories of intentionality that serve as rivals 
to PIT.
There are many different theories about the origin of intentionality. Nearly eve-
ryone agrees that, regardless of its origin, intentionality can be ‘passed around’ 
(Kriegel, 2013), so to speak, to other things which did not previously have it.2 For 
example, both linguistic signs and physical road signs exhibit ‘aboutness’, or have a 
representational nature, but they do not do so intrinsically; rather, the aboutness of 
both types of signs derives from the aboutness of the intentional mental states of the 
humans responsible for fixing their respective meanings. Reflection upon the inten-
tionality of signs suggests that one can draw a distinction between two basic kinds 
of intentionality: (a) source intentionality (or ’original intentionality’ as it is some-
times called), and (b) derived intentionality. ‘Source intentionality’ refers to those 
things that are intrinsically intentional (and so that serve as the source of intention-
ality), whereas ‘derived intentionality’ refers to those things that have intentionality 
in virtue of some other thing that has intentionality. Providing an account of derived 
intentionality is an essential task for any complete theory of intentionality.3 How-
ever, the main goal of such a theory is to explain the nature of source intentionality.
During the twentieth century, the popular philosophical project concerning source 
intentionality was to ‘naturalize’ it by providing a reductionistic explanation of the 
phenomenon in terms of properties and processes that are fully comprehensible by 
natural science (Dretske, 1981, 1995; Fodor, 1987, 1990; Millikan, 1984; Neander, 
1996; Papineau, 1984; Rupert, 1999; Stampe, 1977).4 The two most popular natu-
ralistic theories of this sort are tracking theories of intentionality and functional role 
theories of intentionality. Tracking theories conceptualize source intentionality in 
terms of tracking relations, where ‘tracking’ is a matter of brain states “detecting, 
carrying information about, or otherwise corresponding with external items in the 
environment” (Mendelovici & Bourget, 2014, p. 326). Functional roles theories, by 
contrast, define source intentionality in terms of the functional roles that brain states 
play.
The phenomenal intentionality thesis (PIT) is a relatively new theory of intention-
ality that is increasingly regarded as a promising alternative to tracking theories and 
functional role theories. While the idea of phenomenal intentionality derives from 
the work of Brian Loar at the end of the 1980s (Loar, 1987), the term ‘phenomenal 
2 There are exceptions. Angela Mendelovici (2018), for instance, denies the existence of derived inten-
tionality.
3 Some prominent accounts of derived intentionality include the views known as potentialism (Searle 
1992), inferentialism (Loar 2003), interpretivism (Kriegel 2011), and self-ascriptivism (Mendelovici 
2018).
4 The naturalistic project seeks to specify the relationship between intentionality and natural properties 
not only in terms of reduction, but also in terms of supervenience.
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intentionality’ did not officially enter the philosophical lexicon until the early 2000s 
(Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Loar, 2003). PIT can be understood as the conjunction of 
the following two claims:
(1) There is a kind of intentionality, called ‘phenomenal intentionality’, grounded 
in a type of phenomenal character (i.e. a type of conscious experience).
(2) Phenomenal intentionality is the only kind of source intentionality.
There are many reasons to endorse PIT, a significant one: the view arguably avoids 
the problem of content determinacy that afflicts naturalistic theories of intentionality. 
Source intentional states possess determinate content, which is to say, the intentional 
objects of such states are represented in a fine-grained, unambiguous manner. Kriegel 
defines the concept of ‘determinate content’ in the following manner:
“By ‘determinate content’, I simply mean content which is as fine-grained as 
one’s intentional contents appear pre-theoretically to be. For example, pre-the-
oretically it seems that one’s thoughts are fine-grained enough to be about rab-
bits rather than undetected rabbit parts, about Phosphorus rather than Hespe-
rus, about triangles rather than closed trilateral figures, and so on. If a kind of 
intentional state is not this fine-grained, I say that its content is indeterminate” 
(Kriegel, 2013, p. 10).
Functional role theories and tracking theories of intentionality both appear unable 
to account for the fact that source intentional states bear determinate content. Bourget 
and Mendelovici (2014) formulate the problem in an epistemic fashion via Quine’s 
(1960) famous ‘rabbit/undetached rabbit parts’ example. They point out that complete 
knowledge of all of the relevant tracking relations or functional role relations does 
not translate into knowledge of determinate content: “A Martian looking down on 
Earth and having complete knowledge of all Earthly physical facts could not tell 
whether we are representing rabbits or undetected rabbit parts. Thus, it appears that a 
physical-functional theory of intentionality will predict that one’s concept RABBIT is 
indeterminate between the two contents” (Bourget & Mendelovici, 2014). The idea, to 
paraphrase, is that naturalistic theories of intentionality confront an epistemic problem 
of content determinacy that arguably has ontological implications. Natural properties 
are seemingly unable to secure determinate mental content if knowledge of all relevant 
naturalistic facts does not convert into knowledge of content determinacy. This is 
where PIT enters into the picture. Graham et al. (2007), Horgan and Graham (2012), 
and Searle (1990) all contend that phenomenal consciousness is the only thing capable 
of securing determinate mental content. This is known as the content determinacy 
argument for PIT, which is just one out of many existing arguments for the view.5
5 Horgan and Tienson (2002) present a phenomenological argument supporting PIT, according to which 
it is introspectively obvious that some conscious experiences are source intentional and source inten-
tional in virtue of being phenomenal. Two additional arguments for the view come from the work of 
Charles Siewert and Brian Loar, respectively. Siewert (1998) avers that PIT is true in virtue of the fact 
that conscious experiences are assessable for accuracy, whereas Loar (2003) connects internalism about 
mental content with PIT, arguing that the latter theory is true on the basis of the former.
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2  The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality
I will now present the extended mind argument against PIT. As is indicated by its 
name, the argument appeals to conceptual tools from the extended mind literature 
(Chalmers, 2018; Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Colombetti & Roberts, 
2015; Farkas, 2012; Muller, 2012; Rowlands, 2009; Vold, 2015), and in particular, 
is motivated by a perceived asymmetry according to which some source intentional 
mental states extend into the environment (i.e. the extended mind thesis is true), 
but no conscious mental states extend into the environment (i.e. the extended con-
sciousness thesis is false). Call this the bipartite extension intuition (BEI). If BEI is 
true, then PIT is false, for BEI entails that there are cases of extended cognition that 
are source-intentional but non-phenomenal while PIT claims that source-intentional 
states are necessarily phenomenal. The argument has the following structure:
2.1  The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality
P1 Some source intentional states are extended (i.e. the extended mind thesis is 
true).
P2 No conscious states are extended (i.e. the extended consciousness thesis is false).
P3 P1 and P2 are mutually inconsistent if PIT is true.
C Therefore, PIT is false.
P3 is true by definition. If phenomenal intentionality is the only kind of source 
intentionality (i.e. PIT is true), then the extension of source intentional states implies 
the extension of phenomenally conscious states. That is, the combination of PIT and 
P1 entails the extended consciousness thesis. However, P2 rejects the extended con-
sciousness thesis, meaning that P1 and P2 are mutually inconsistent, assuming the 
veracity of PIT. The proponent of PIT must, therefore, either uphold P1 and reject 
P2 (by affirming that some conscious states are extended), uphold P2 and reject P1 
(by affirming that no source intentional states are extended), or reject both P1 and 
P2. The proponent cannot support both premises without violating the fundamental 
tenet of PIT because P1 and P2 jointly imply the existence of an extended source 
intentional state that lacks phenomenal consciousness, and therefore, phenomenal 
intentionality. So if it is held fixed that both P1 and P2 are true and mutually consist-
ent with one another, then it must be the case that PIT is false. Put another way, the 
argument asserts that the conjunction of PIT and the extended mind thesis leads to a 
contradiction because this conjunction entails the extended consciousness thesis, but 
the extended consciousness thesis is false.
The strength of the extended mind argument against PIT turns on the plausibil-
ity of P1 and P2, the combination of which constitutes BEI. Before turning towards 
these premises, it is vital first to address an objection that one might raise to the 
argument as a whole. Namely,
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Objection 1 (O1) The extended mind thesis tacitly assumes the truth of the func-
tional role theory of intentionality, and thus, tacitly assumes that PIT is false. There-
fore, one cannot invoke the extended mind thesis to argue against PIT without beg-
ging the question.
O1 suggests that I beg the question right out of the gate simply by casting my 
argument against PIT within the context of the extended mind framework. One 
cannot fully appreciate the reasoning behind O1 without first having a grasp of 
the extended mind thesis. The extended mind thesis derives from Andy Clark and 
David Chalmers (1998). They contend that cognitive processes can under certain 
conditions transcend the boundaries of the skull and seep out into the external world 
such that extra-cranial entities partly constitute them.6 Clark & Chalmers’ original 
argument for the extended mind is motivated primarily by what they call the parity 
principle, which establishes the possibility of extended cognitive processes based 
on functional equivalency considerations: “If, as we confront some task, a part of 
the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). Clark 
and Chalmers apply the parity principle to the now-famous case of Otto, a fictional 
Alzheimer’s patient who carries around a notebook as a substitute for his impaired 
biological memory. Given that Otto’s notebook plays the same functional role in his 
cognitive economy that biological memory would otherwise play, Clark and Chalm-
ers argue that the notebook and the writings therein should be conceptualized as a 
part of the realization base for some of Otto’s dispositional belief states (specifically 
his belief about the location of the Museum of Modern Art).
It is because the extended mind thesis presupposes the parity principle that O1 
may appear compelling. The parity principle seems to assume a functionalist picture 
of mentality, according to which X counts as mental if and only if X plays the req-
uisite functional role in the overall cognitive system.7 What is true about mentality, 
so the idea goes, is also true about intentionality. Therefore, the parity principle, and 
by extension, the extended mind thesis, is committed to the functional role theory of 
intentionality.
O1 is flawed because it falsely assumes that what is true about the nature of men-
tality must also be true about the nature of source intentionality. It does not follow 
7 Colombetti and Roberts make this point in the context of considering how the extended mind theorist 
conceptualizes the ‘mark of the mental’: "The simplest mark thesis that could be extracted from this 
[parity] principle is a broadly functionalist one: x is a mental state iff x occupies the right causal role” 
(Colombetti & Roberts 2015: 360).
6 Clark and Chalmers label the extended mind thesis as a version of what they call ‘active externalism’. 
The view is ‘active’ because the extra-cranial entities in question are proximal (as opposed to distal), 
meaning that these entities can causally influence the cognitive subject, and the cognitive subject is in 
turn able to influence them causally. Active externalism contrasts with passive externalism, including 
Putnam’s natural kind externalism (Putnam 1975) and Burge’s social externalism (Burge 1979).
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from the fact that the extended mind theorist is committed to a functionalist theory 
of mentality to the conclusion that she must also embrace a functionalist theory of 
source intentionality. This is because the question of what constitutes the mark of 
the mental is distinct from the question of what constitutes source intentionality. 
Some philosophers, to be sure, would deny the conceptual independence of these 
questions precisely because they identify source intentionality as the mark of the 
mental. But the philosophers who make this identification are not advocates of the 
extended mind thesis. Quite to the contrary, Adams & Aizawa (2008) equate source 
intentionality with the mark of the mental as a way to argue against the extended 
mind thesis.8
The extended mind theorist can thus uphold a functional role theory of mentality 
without thereby being committed to a functional role theory of intentionality. Func-
tionalism about mentality is compatible with PIT, which is to say, mentality may 
be defined in functional terms while source intentionality is defined in phenomenal 
terms. O1 can thus be discarded. I will now examine P1 and P2 (i.e. BEI) of the 
extended mind argument against PIT, starting with P1, the premise that some source 
intentional states are examples of extended cognition.
3  Premise 1: Some source intentional states are extended
Upon first glance, P1 may even strike proponents of the traditional extended mind 
thesis as untenable, for they might maintain that only dispositional mental states 
with derived intentionality can be extended. Dispositional mental states are states 
that an agent is disposed to instantiate given certain conditions, whereas occurrent 
mental states refer to states that an agent is currently instantiating. A mental state 
is occurrent if and only if a subject is actively entertaining the state. Dispositional 
mental states (e.g. my standing belief that Washington, D.C. is the United States 
capital) ostensively inherit their intentionality from their occurrent counterparts, and 
therefore, only have derived intentionality.
Clark and Chalmers’ original presentation of the extended mind thesis argues for 
extended dispositional mental states, not extended occurrent mental states. Namely, 
Otto’s dispositional belief concerning the location of the Museum of Modern Art 
extends into the environment in virtue of being constituted by a written proposition 
located in his notebook. Otto’s occurrent belief about the museum’s location, how-
ever, which he instantiates after consulting his notebook, is presumably a completely 
internal affair that takes place within the confines of his head. What one needs to 
support P1 is an independent argument for why some occurrent mental states are 
8 Interestingly, Adams & Aizawa (2008) argue that the extended mind thesis is false because (a) source 
intentionality constitutes the mark of the mental and (b) source intentional states cannot be extended. In 
this paper I contend that (b) is false (i.e. source intentional states can be extended) in an effort to moti-
vate the extended mind argument against PIT.
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extended. In what follows, I draw attention to a prominent case promulgated by 
Clark (2008) that lends credence to the idea that the extended mind thesis encom-
passes some occurrent states.
Clark’s (2008) argument for extended occurrent states, like the original 
extended mind argument for extended dispositional states (1998), assumes a 
broadly functionalist picture of mentality. The novelty of Clark’s newer argument 
derives from his use of the functional concept of a self-stimulating loop. A system 
X enacts a self-stimulating loop when X produces outputs that it then recycles 
back into inputs. Clark illustrates the concept via the example of a turbo-driven 
engine, which uses its own emissions as a self-generating boost. His central 
contention is that occurrent cognitive processes count as extended when these 
processes become transiently coupled with external entities to produce a self-
stimulating feedback loop. Clark begins to make this case by drawing attention 
to bodily gestures, arguing that gestures are not merely expressions of thought but 
are often constitutive components of occurrent thought processes which function 
as both systemic outputs and self-stimulated inputs in a subject’s cognitive system: 
“the act of gesturing is part and parcel of a coupled neural-bodily unfolding that 
is itself usefully seen as an organismically extended process of thought” (Clark, 
2008, p. 144).9 The concern for Clark’s appeal to bodily gesture is that such 
an appeal at best establishes that cognition is embodied, not extended. To be 
extended, cognitive processes must be partly constituted by entities in the outer 
environment, not simply by extra-cranial body parts. Clark recognizes this, of 
course, and proceeds to explain that occurrent cognitive processes can form self-
stimulating loops with external entities as well. In offering this explanation, he 
focuses on processes that are aided by the act of writing:
This kind of cognitively pregnant unfolding need not stop at the boundary of 
the biological organism. Something very similar may, as frequently remarked, 
occur when we are busy writing and thinking at the same time. It is not always 
that fully formed thoughts get committed to paper. Rather, the paper provides 
a medium in which, this time via some kind of coupled neural-scribbling-read-
ing unfolding, we are enabled to explore ways of thinking that might otherwise 
be unavailable to us (Clark, 2008, p. 144).
The mental acts of calculation and planning are good examples of the kind of 
occurrent cognitive processes that Clark seems to have in mind: processes enhanced 
through the medium of writing by forming self-stimulating feedback loops with the 
independent artifacts constitutive of writing (e.g. pen and paper). The marks that I 
make on a piece of paper when thinking through a math problem, for example, are 
external outputs of cognition which are then redistributed as stimulating inputs dur-
ing my occurrent act of calculation. So the written marks are not merely material 
9 To justify this assertion, Clark draws on empirical research conducted by McNeil (2005) on the use of 
gesture in spontaneous speech and Goldin-Meadow (2003) on how gesturing functions to reduce the neu-
ral cognitive load for memory tasks.
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manifestations of thought but are active drivers of my mathematical thinking opera-
tion. Clark’s basic stance, to repeat, is that occurrent cognitive processes extend into 
the environment when deeply and reciprocally interwoven with external entities in a 
feedback loop of this sort.
My intention in this section is to transform Clark’s discussion of self-stimulating 
loops into a formal argument for P1. The key sub-premise of this argument, which I 
call the self-stimulating loop argument, can be represented as follows:
SP1 The occurrent states involved in self-stimulating feedback loops are extended 
cognitive systems.
Notice that SP1 does not on its own entail the veracity of P1. To reach the 
conclusion that some source intentional states are extended, something like the 
following additional sub-premise needs to be made explicit: All occurrent states 
possess source intentionality. This additional sub-premise appears to be on solid 
footing, for as previously mentioned, it is commonly assumed in the literature 
that the intentionality of dispositional mental states derives from the source 
intentionality of their occurrent counterparts. There are various philosophers of 
mind, however, who reject the assumption that all occurrent states are source 
intentional. For example, David Woodruff Smith (2011) argues that there are 
occurrent states of ‘pure’ consciousness achievable via meditation that are entirely 
devoid of intentionality.10 I propose that the key to strengthening the self-stimulating 
loop argument for P1 is to restrict the scope of the argument to the class of occurrent 
mental states known as propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are types 
of mental states wherein a subject bears a cognitive relation to a proposition. 
Examples of such attitudes include (but are not limited to) states of belief, desire, 
understanding, and imagination. The assumption that all occurrent propositional 
attitudes (or “OPAs”) have source intentionality, combined with the claim that some 
OPAs extend into the environment via self-stimulating loops, ostensibly entails the 
veracity of P1. When conceptualized in this way, the self-stimulating loop argument 
has the following structure:
3.1  The self‑stimulating loop argument for P1
SP1 The occurrent states involved in self-stimulating feedback loops are extended 
cognitive systems.
SP2 Some occurrent states involved in self-stimulating feedback loops are proposi-
tional attitudes.
10 Smith describes these alleged states of pure (non-intentional) consciousness as follows: “In sustained 
meditation the sense of object disappears, i.e. the intentional content or object-specifying sense disap-
pears, and the sense of self or subject disappears. That is to say, the usual intentional structure of subject 
object-or subject-act-content-object-dissolves in such a meditative state” (Smith, 2011, p. 481).
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SC1 Therefore, some occurrent propositional attitudes are extended.
SP3 All occurrent propositional attitudes possess source intentionality.
P1 Therefore, some source intentional states are extended.
Consider first SP2, which I take to be well substantiated. The occurrent states 
of < planning > and < calculating > that Clark focuses on when presenting the self-
stimulating loop argument appear to be propositional attitudes given that these states 
are both linguistically represented by verbs which embed ‘that-clauses.’ Moreover, 
even if the states of < planning > and < calculating > are not propositional attitudes, it 
is easy to imagine how one might expand Clark’s argument for extended occurrent 
states so that it includes within its purview standard propositional attitudes such as 
beliefs, judgments, desires, and fears. Colombetti and Roberts (2015), for instance, 
illustrate how Clark’s argument can be understood to include occurrent judgments 
within its scope. They consider the fictional case of Eve, a teenage girl who writes 
in her diary when she is upset with her parents: “The case of Eve, as we imagine 
it, is one where, as she writes that her parents do not listen to her, do not appreciate 
her, and so on, she is engaged in unfolding and articulating a specific evaluative 
judgment, which the act of writing down helps to clarify and structure. This act also 
feeds back into Eve, influencing her overall evaluative perspective as she continues 
to be engaged in the activity” (Colombetti & Roberts, 2015, p. 1258). The case of 
Eve is supposed to be an example of how a standard OPA can meet Clark’s ‘self-
stimulating loop’ criteria for mental extension. Specifically, Eve’s act of writing 
in her notebook serves as a self-stimulating feedback loop in her occurrent act of 
judging her parents.11
Turn now to SP3, which also strikes me as highly credible. SP3 gains support 
from the fact that OPAs are paradigmatic examples of source intentional states 
in the literature, which is to say, all theories of source intentionality (including 
PIT, tracking theories, and functional role theories) appear to either explicitly or 
implicitly recognize SP3 to be true. While there is controversy in the philosophy 
of mind over whether all mental states have intentionality, and even over whether 
all occurrent states have source intentionality, it is uncontroversial to declare that 
all OPAs have source intentionality. This being said, the objector might purport 
that SP3 does not necessarily follow from the fact that OPAs are paradigmatic 
examples of source intentional states. Just because a genus X is a paradigmatic 
example of that which has property P does not mean that all species of X instanti-
ate P. For instance, birds are paradigmatic examples of flying animals, but it is not 
the case that all species of birds can fly (e.g. ostriches). Analogously, the objector 
might grant that OPAs are paradigmatic examples of source intentionality, but 
11 Colombetti and Roberts argue for the extension of occurrent judgments only as a part of a larger pro-
ject of arguing for extended occurrent emotions.
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deny that all OPAs are source-intentional. The most natural way for the propo-
nent of PIT to maintain such a position is to allege that some OPAs lack phenom-
enal consciousness.12 If OPAs include non-conscious states, then to assume that 
all OPAs are source intentional is to presuppose that PIT is false, for PIT main-
tains that source intentionality is phenomenally conscious intentionality. Thus, 
one might attempt to resist SP3 on the grounds that it begs the question against 
PIT:
Objection 2 (O2) The self-stimulating loop argument fails because SP3 begs the 
question against PIT.
The advocate of O2 is correct to suggest that a species X does not necessar-
ily have property P just because the genus to which X belongs is a paradigmatic 
example of that which instantiates P. However, the fact that OPAs are paradigmatic 
examples of source intentional states lends a significant degree of credence to SP3, 
and the burden of proof is surely on those who wish to reject this sub-premise. The 
proponent of PIT might try to disavow SP3 by affirming that some OPAs are non-
conscious but I deny that said proponent has the conceptual resources to make this 
affirmation.
First, PIT is arguably wedded to the idea that all OPAs are phenomenally con-
scious in virtue of being motivated by what Kriegel (2013) calls inseparatism, the 
view that “paradigmatic sensory states in fact exhibit intentionality, which is moreo-
ver grounded by their phenomenality, and that paradigmatic cognitive states in fact 
boast a phenomenality, which moreover grounds their intentionality” (Kriegel, 2013, 
p. 5). Inseparatism contrasts with a more traditional view of mind in analytic phi-
losophy that Horgan and John (2002) label ‘separatism’, which holds that sensory 
mental states are phenomenally conscious but non-intentional, and cognitive mental 
states are intentional but non-phenomenal. Since PIT is partly motivated by insepa-
ratism, and OPAs are paradigmatic cognitive states, it would seem as if PIT is com-
mitted to the notion that all OPAs are phenomenal. Second, the proponent of PIT 
cannot hold that some OPAs are non-conscious without also claiming that the OPAs 
in question have either derived intentionality or lack intentionality altogether. But it 
is wildly implausible that OPAs lack intentionality altogether, and it is even difficult 
to see how they could have derived intentionality. To say that an OPA has derived 
intentionality is to say that its intentionality is explainable in terms of some further 
intentional system. The problem is that one cannot easily understand the intention-
ality of OPAs in terms of some further intentional system; at least not in the same 
way that the intentionality of things like highway signs and linguistic objects can be 
understood in terms of the intentional mental states of the humans responsible for 
12 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this potential dialectical move 
by the defender of PIT.
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fixing their respective meanings. These reasons suggest that PIT is committed to 
SP3, which means that SP3 does not beg the question against PIT.13
The most controversial sub-premise of the self-stimulating loop argument is 
undoubtedly SP1. The primary way to reject SP1 is to follow Robert Rupert (2004, 
2009a, 2009b, 2011) in distinguishing the extended mind thesis from the embedded 
mind thesis and claim that the self-stimulating loop case is best interpreted through 
the framework of the embedded model. This gives rise to the following objection:
Objection 3 (O3) SP1 is false because self-stimulating loop cases are best construed 
though the framework of embedded cognition over the framework of extended 
cognition.
The embedded mind thesis advocates for an internalist vision of cognition while 
upholding that cognitive systems are nevertheless deeply interactive with and per-
haps even casually reliant upon external entities. Rupert defines embedded cogni-
tion thusly: “Cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected ways, 
on organismically external props and devices and on the structure of the external 
environment in which cognition takes place” (Rupert, 2004, p. 393). The thesis 
of embedded cognition is significantly more conservative than the extended view, 
which presents an externalist vision of cognition according to which cognitive sys-
tems can temporarily extend beyond the body into the outer world. Rupert argues 
that the embedded model is preferable over the extended model because the for-
mer possesses more explanatory power and is less metaphysically profligate than 
the latter. He thus denies that self-stimulating loop cases are genuine cases of mind 
extension. While cognition may intimately depend upon external artifacts during 
loop-related activity, the artifacts are not themselves a part of cognition, according 
to Rupert.14
14 This criticism is similar in many respects to the famous ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy promulgated 
by Adams and Aizawa (2001), which holds that the extended mind thesis is the result of a fallacious 
inference from the fact that external entities are causally coupled to cognitive processes to the conclu-
sion that such entities are constitutive components of cognitive processes. Casual relevancy, according to 
Adams and Aizawa, does not entail constitutive role-playing.
13 Upon first glance, it might seem as if Angela Mendelovici (2018, 2020) defends a view of OPAs 
which rejects SP3. Mendelovici is one of the leading proponents of PIT in the field and advocates for a 
view of OPAs, which she calls self-ascriptivism, according to which “propositional attitudes are derived 
representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude types from our self-ascriptions” 
(Mendelovici 2020: 1). Since derived representational states lack intentionality altogether on Mendelovici’s 
view, it might seem as if she not only rejects SP3 or the assertion that all OPAs are source intentional, 
but that she also rejects the more moderate assertion that some OPAs are source intentional. However, 
Mendelovici’s self-ascriptivism only accounts for the alleged contents of propositional attitudes and does 
not account for the immediate contents of such attitudes. The immediate contents of propositional attitudes 
are the contents that are directly accessible via introspection. In contrast, the alleged contents are the 
contents that folk psychology takes propositional attitudes to have or the contents that we normally attribute 
to ‘that-clauses’. Mendelovici identifies the immediate contents of propositional attitudes with phenomenal 
contents, meaning that she believes that OPAs contain a phenomenally conscious aspect. She says, “we 
think in phenomenal tags that we take to stand for more complex and sophisticated contents” (Mendelovici 
2018: 154). This filled-in picture of Mendelovici’s view of OPAs allows us to see that she does not actually 
reject P* but instead holds that OPAs have both a phenomenal intentional aspect (i.e. immediate contents) 
and a non-phenomenal, non-intentional aspect (i.e. alleged contents).
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Rupert’s main contention in favor of the embedded model is that internal cog-
nitive processes and their external functional analogs possess such different causal 
profiles that one should conceptualize them as distinct natural kinds.15 Regarding 
self-stimulating loops in particular, Rupert (2009a, 2009b) avers that outer contri-
butions to the production of intelligent behavior during loop-related activity asym-
metrically depend on the contributions of the internal cognitive architecture. For 
example, the sketchpad in the aforementioned self-stimulating loop case is reliant 
upon some set of neural activity to help drive cognition, but the relevant neural sys-
tems are not in turn reliant upon the sketchpad given that these systems alone, in 
the absence of any external scaffolding, are sufficient for the realization of cognitive 
processes. Asymmetric relations like these between internal cognitive mechanisms 
and external cognitive artifacts lead Rupert to conclude that there is no compelling 
theoretical reason to regard self-stimulating loops as instances of extended cogni-
tion. Worse still, Rupert (2009a) argues that adopting the extended mind framework 
in self-stimulating loop cases comes at a significant scientific cost. He stresses that 
widespread acceptance of self-stimulating loops as extended cognitive systems 
would inhibit our ability to locate persisting biological subjects for psychological 
and cognitive scientific research.16 For all of these reasons, Rupert alleges that exter-
nal entities implicated in loop related activity are properly construed as cognitive 
scaffolds rather than cognitive extensions. Hence O3.
Clark (2008) presents a multifaceted response to O3 in defense of SP1. First, he 
repudiates the idea that external entities involved in self-stimulating loops should 
not be regarded as cognitive simply because they do not share the same fine-grained 
casual profile as their neural counterparts. Clark says this idea is the product of 
unjustified anthropocentrism and neurocentrism and results from a misinterpretation 
of the parity principle. The parity principle, according to Clark, does not mandate 
a fine-grained identity of causal profile but is rather “a call for sameness of oppor-
tunity, such that bio external elements might turn out to be parts of the machinery 
of cognition even if their contributions are unlike (perhaps deeply complementary 
to) those of the biological brain” (Clark, 2008, p. 135). Furthermore, Clark denies 
that relations of asymmetric dependence are relevant to the question of individuating 
cognitive systems. He supports this denial by noting that the internal neural archi-
tecture is composed of various mechanisms, some of which are themselves asym-
metrically dependent on others for their role in cognition. Since these internal neural 
mechanisms clearly qualify as cognitive despite being asymmetrically dependent, 
15 Rupert (2004) draws upon psychological research on working memory to make this contention, show-
ing that internal memory processes possess significantly different fin-grained causal profiles than forms 
of external memory storage. For example, unlike external memory, internal working memory is integral 
to the successful execution of verbal exchanges, and is associated with particular kinds of interference 
patterns in paired-associates experiments.
16 For example, with respect to developmental psychology, Rupert maintains that the extended mind the-
sis “offers developmental psychologists no more reason to be interested in, for example, the series of 
temporal segments we normally associate with Sally from ages two-to-six than it offers to be interested 
in, say, Sally, aged two, together with a ball she was bouncing on some particular day, Johnny, aged 
five, together with the book he was reading on some particular afternoon, and Terry, aged seven, pus the 
stimulus item he has just been shown by an experimenter” (Rupert 2009a: 15).
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Clark avers that external entities implicated in loop-related activity which are simi-
larly asymmetrically dependent should also be eligible to be granted the status of 
‘cognitive.’
Finally, in response to Rupert’s assertion that self-stimulating loops are not 
instances of extended cognition because interpreting them as such comes at a high 
scientific cost, Clark distinguishes between organism centered cognition and organ-
ism bound cognition. He maintains that the extended mind thesis does not diminish 
the scientific concept of a stable, persisting biological subject given that it preserves 
the vision of cognition as organism centered even though it denies that cognition is 
organism bound.17 Clark thus disaffirms that conceptualizing self-stimulating loops 
as extended cognitive systems fails to dovetail with the methodology of cognitive 
science. Quite to the contrary, he insists that the embedded mind thesis is the one 
in danger of falling victim to a nonscientific conceptual paradigm, avowing that the 
embedded model “threatens to repeat for outer circuits and elements the mistake 
that Dennett (1991) warns us against with regard to inner circuits and elements. It 
[the embedded mind thesis] depicts such outer resources as doing their work only 
by parading structure and information in front of some thoughtful inner overseer” 
(Clark, 2008, p. 153). According to Clark, once we dispense with the scientifically 
flawed notion of a privileged inner homunculus that directs the flow of all bio exter-
nal information coming into the brain, the extended mind interpretation of self-stim-
ulating loop cases becomes significantly more credible.
Suppose now that Clark’s response to O3 is successful, meaning that the OPAs 
involved in loop-related activity are cases of extended cognition. Even if this is true, 
and one acknowledges that all OPAs have source intentionality, the objector might 
nevertheless insist that self-stimulating loops fail to demonstrate that some source 
intentional states are extended. In other words, the objector might concede that all 
of the premises of the self-stimulating loop argument are true but maintain that the 
argument is invalid because the premises do not jointly imply P1. The idea, in par-
ticular, is that P1 does not follow from the conjunction of SC1 and SP3. Accord-
ing to this final possible objection, one cannot use the extended mind thesis to infer 
extended intentionality because it is a thesis about representational vehicles and not 
representational contents. Hence,
Objection 4 (O4) The self-stimulating loop argument is invalid because the extended 
mind thesis concerns representational vehicles, not representational contents.
When discussing the concept of mental representation, philosophers of mind 
often distinguish between the vehicle of representation and the content of repre-
sentation (Hurley, 1998). The vehicle denotes the physical substrate that does the 
representing, whereas the content picks out that which is represented (i.e. what the 
17 Clark says, “In rejecting the vision of human cognitive processing as organism bound, we should not 
feel forced to deny that it is (in most, perhaps all, real-world cases) organism centered. It is indeed pri-
marily (though not solely) the biological organism that, courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, 
spins and maintains (or more minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then 
form parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing” (Clark 2008: 141).
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representation is ‘about’). The important point in this context is that intentionality 
is a feature of representational contents, not vehicles, and the extended mind thesis 
appears to pertain exclusively to vehicles. Indeed, Clark & Chalmers originally clas-
sified the extended mind as a version of vehicle externalism. They claim that “under 
certain circumstances we should see the material vehicles that realize the mind as 
encompassing not just brain activity, but also that of the body and the material envi-
ronment” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 1243, emphasis added). If the extended mind 
thesis does not also encompass representational contents, then it cannot shed light on 
the prospect of extended intentionality. So, while the relevant OPAs may qualify as 
instances of extended cognition, they are arguably not examples of extended source 
intentionality because only the vehicles of these attitudes extend into the environ-
ment during loop-related activity. The source intentionality of OPAs is found in their 
content, but this content does not extend into the environment if O4 is correct.18
To counter O4 the defender of P1 must reject the notion that the extended mind 
thesis pertains exclusively to representational vehicles. Fortunately, a strong case 
can be made that entities in the material environment can partly constitute both vehi-
cles and content. Holger Lyre (2016) contends that the extended mind thesis entails 
what he calls active content externalism, given the plausible assumption that content 
supervenes on vehicles. According to Lyre, the claim that content supervenes on 
vehicles is a relatively widespread assumption in the philosophy of mind.19 To say 
that content supervenes on vehicles is to say that vehicles play a determinative role 
with respect to content, for determination is the converse concept of supervenience. 
If vehicles do determine content, and the extended mind thesis is correct in asserting 
that the vehicles of cognition sometimes include external factors in the environment, 
then it follows that external factors sometimes partly determine mental content. To 
illustrate, recall the fictional case of Otto and his notebook. Otto, an Alzheimer’s 
patient, is taken to possess the extended belief that the MOMA is on 53rd street 
insofar as his notebook (which contains the directions to the MOMA) is a constitu-
tive component of his cognitive system. Importantly, Otto’s extended belief is true 
only insofar as his notebook contains the correct address to the museum, mean-
ing that if Otto’s notebook had included an inaccurate address, then his extended 
belief would be false. The content of Otto’s extended belief state is therefore actively 
determined by an aspect of the external world; namely, his notebook and the writ-
ings therein. Lyre elucidates this point by presenting a twin earth scenario involving 
Otto: “on twin earth Twotto wants to meet Twinga. But Twotto’s notebook mistak-
enly displays 51st street as MOMA’s address. So Twotto won’t meet Twinga. This 
shows [that]….a variation of the external component of the cognitive system, in this 
case the notebook entry, may change mental content in a behaviorally relevant man-
ner” (Lyre, 2016, p. 7, emphasis added).
18 It is actually unclear whether or not Clark and Chalmers’ original discussion of the extended mind is 
meant to apply to just vehicles. When invoking the fictional case of Otto to argue for extended beliefs, 
Clark and Chalmers appear to insinuate that the content of Otto’s belief state depends partly on external 
components outside the brain (i.e. on the notebook itself). I elaborate on this point below.
19 Moreover, the assumption has recently been explicitly defended by Gottfried Vosgerau (2018).
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While Lyre focuses on the case of Otto and extended dispositional states to sup-
port active content externalism, the view is also naturally supported by extended 
OPAs. Recall the fictional case of Eve, whose occurrent act of judging her parents 
extends into the environment via the self-stimulating feedback loop that she forms 
with her notebook. The propositional content of Eve’s occurrent judgment is also 
actively shaped by the written outputs that she jots down onto the page, for these 
outputs “feed back into Eve, influencing her overall evaluative perspective as she 
continues to be engaged in the activity” (Colombetti & Roberts, 2015, p. 1258). 
The cases of Eve and Otto examples show that O4 is mistaken in suggesting that 
the extended mind thesis does not pertain to representational contents. By profess-
ing that content supervenes on vehicles, the advocate of the self-stimulating loop 
argument for P1 can uphold that the pertinent OPAs represent instances of extended 
source intentionality, and not merely extended cognition. Put differently, P1 does 
follow from the conjunction of SC1 and SP3 assuming the extended mind thesis 
implies active content externalism.
The aim of this section has been to motivate the self-stimulating loop argument 
for P1 and defend the argument against anticipated objections. I have shown that P1 
is highly plausible given the following philosophical assumptions: (a) some OPAs 
extend into the environment via self-stimulating feedback loops, (b) all OPAs pos-
sess source intentionality, and (c) the extended mind thesis pertains to both vehicles 
and contents. I turn now to P2 of the extended mind argument against PIT. If it is 
assumed for the sake of argument that P1 is true (i.e. some source intentional states 
are extended), and, as has already been established, source intentional states can be 
extended on PIT only if consciousness can be extended, then one of two things must 
be the case: either PIT is false or some conscious states are extended. P2 rejects the 
latter disjunct by affirming that no conscious mental states are extended.
4  Premise 2: no conscious states are extended
In this section I present and motivate an argument for P2 deriving from Chalmers 
(2018), which I call the direct access argument against extended consciousness. The 
argument invokes the idea that cognitive extension requires sensorimotor interac-
tion in addition to functional parity and that consciousness requires direct access 
to information for global control. If the argument is sound and extended conscious-
ness is impossible, then the extended OPAs involved in self-stimulating feedback 
loops must be non-conscious, meaning that these propositional attitudes represent 
instances of source intentionality in the absence of phenomenal consciousness 
(meaning that PIT is false). After unpacking the direct access argument, I briefly 
consider two possible objections: one based on so-called external circuit cases and 
the other based on the enactive theory of consciousness. The central problem with 
these objections, as I explain, is that even if they succeed in undermining the direct 
access argument (which is highly controversial), they nevertheless fail to undermine 
P2 under a proper construal of the premise. To effectively counter P2, the objector 
must show that some currently existing conscious states are extended. In particular, 
the objector must illustrate that the OPAs featured in self-stimulating loop cases are 
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instances of extended consciousness. However, external circuit cases at best estab-
lish the possibility of extended consciousness in high-tech science fiction scenarios, 
whereas enactivism at best illustrates that perceptual conscious states are extended, 
not OPAs.
Chalmers’ argument against extended consciousness can be represented as 
follows:
4.1  The direct access argument against extended consciousness
QP1 A mental state X is extended only if X involves sensorimotor interaction with 
external entities.
QP2 A mental state X is conscious only if X has direct access to information for 
global control.
QC1 Therefore, a mental state X is an extended conscious state only if (i) X features 
sensorimotor interaction with external entities and (ii) X has direct access to infor-
mation for global control.
QP3 (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
QC2 Therefore, extended consciousness is impossible.
Consider first QP1. The immediate thing to notice about this premise is that it is at 
odds with the extended mind thesis as previously formulated. Clark and Chalmers 
(1998), to recall, conceptualize extended mentality in terms of the parity principle. 
Call this conception the ‘original definition of extension’:
Original Definition of Extension (ODE) An external entity X counts as an extended 
mental state of subject S just in case X plays the right functional role in S’s overall 
cognitive system.
Chalmers (2018) takes issue with ODE on the grounds that it is objectionably 
uncontroversial or ‘too weak to be interesting.’ In particular, he concurs with Farkas 
(2012), who contends that ODE is problematic because it includes external circuit 
cases within its purview. External circuit cases are instances where parts of the brain 
are substituted with functionally isomorphic silicon parts located in the outer envi-
ronment and connected directly to internal neural mechanisms by wiring or radio 
transmitters. Clark (2009) offers the following example of an external circuit case:
But now imagine a case in which a person (call her Diva) suffers minor brain 
damage and loses the ability to perform a simple task of arithmetic divi-
sion using only her neural resources. An external silicon circuit is added that 
restores the previous functionality. Diva can now divide just as before, only 
some small part of the work is distributed across the brain and the silicon cir-
 C. Turner 
1 3
cuit: a genuinely mental process (division) is supported by a hybrid bio-tech-
nological system (Clark, 2009).
The case of Diva qualifies as an example of extended cognition according to 
ODE because the external silicon circuit in question satisfies the parity principle. 
This implication of ODE leads Farkas to conclude that ODE is objectionably weak 
and needs to be replaced with a more robust version of the extended mind thesis. 
The extended mind thesis is supposed to be a compelling, controversial hypothesis, 
not a statement of unquestionable veracity. The problem is that the thesis is ren-
dered utterly uncontroversial when interpreted through the lens of ODE, for even the 
most ardent opponents of extended cognition (e.g. Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Rupert, 
2004) concede that cognitive processes can become extended in high-tech science 
fiction scenarios like the case of Diva. Chalmers agrees with Farkas that the bar 
for extended cognition needs to be set higher. He says, “Andy and I could stand our 
ground and stick with our stipulated definition of the extended mind thesis, so that 
Adams, Aizawa, Farkas, and Rupert all count as supporters of the thesis. That would 
be a little akin to the US declaring victory in Vietnam and going home. I think it 
makes more sense to find a stronger formulation of the extended mind thesis that 
captures what is really at issue in the debate” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 4).
Chalmers strengthens the extended mind thesis by adding a ‘sensorimotor 
requirement’ to the conception of cognitive extension. This requirement affirms 
that mental states must involve sensorimotor interaction with entities in the exter-
nal environment to count as extended. Chalmers’ revised formulation of the thesis 
is comprised of both this sensorimotor requirement as well as the original parity 
principle:
Revised Definition of Extension (RDE) An external entity X counts as an extended 
mental state of subject S just in case (a) S interacts with X via perception and action, 
and (b) X plays the right functional role in S’s overall cognitive system.
Chalmers believes that RDE, which is essentially synonymous with QP1, gets 
the best of both worlds. On the one hand, it accommodates trademark cases of 
extended mental processes, like the fictional case of Otto (extended dispositional 
states) and the fictional case of Eve (extended occurrent states). On the other hand, 
RDE bypasses Farkas’ ‘too weak to be compelling’ criticism of the extended mind. 
External circuit cases do not involve sensorimotor interaction given that the cir-
cuits in question are connected directly to the brain via radio transmitters or wiring. 
The case of Diva therefore fails to meet the relevant criteria for extended cognition, 
according to RDE.20
20 To be clear, RDE does not hold that mentality in general requires sensorimotor interaction. The idea is 
not that sensorimotor interaction is a necessary condition for mindedness at large; it is rather the weaker 
claim that sensorimotor interaction is a necessary condition for extended mindedness. So, extended cir-
cuit cases do qualify as mental according to RDE, they just do not qualify as extended mental processes 
on the view.
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Crucially, the adoption of RDE over ODE in no way affects the strength of Clark’s 
self-stimulating loop argument for P1. OPAs bound up in self-stimulating loops with 
external entities satisfy the sensorimotor interaction condition for cognitive exten-
sion. For example, consider the previously discussed case of Eve and the self-stim-
ulating loop that she forms with her notepad during the occurrent act of judging her 
parents. Eve engages with her notepad via perception and action; she looks at the 
notepad, turns its pages, and writes feverishly inside it. The relationship between Eve 
and her notepad is markedly different from the relationship between Diva and her 
external neural prosthetic device. Unlike Diva, Eve qualifies as a cognitive extender 
from the perspective of RDE because her cognitive artifact necessitates sensorimotor 
engagement instead of bypassing her perceptual faculties. The upshot of this is that 
the proponent of the extended mind argument against PIT can invoke RDE to help 
justify P2 without undercutting the self-stimulating loop argument for P1.
Turn now to QP2, the second key premise of Chalmers’ argument against 
extended consciousness. QP2 states that a mental state is phenomenally conscious 
only if it has direct access to information for global control. Call this the direct 
access condition.21 Chalmers (1996, 1998) originally proposes the direct access 
condition as a ‘pre-experimental bridging principle’ that neuroscientists can use to 
help isolate the neural correlates of consciousness, or the set of mechanisms in the 
brain jointly sufficient for conscious experience. Discovering the neural correlates 
of consciousness is a notoriously daunting scientific task since consciousness is not 
directly observable or measurable. However, Chalmers indicates that conscious-
ness can be indirectly measured by first propounding a functional property associ-
ated with conscious experience and then identifying the neural correlations of this 
functional property. The relevant functional property is regarded as a ‘pre-experi-
mental bridging principle’ because it must be presupposed prior to any experimental 
research into the nature of consciousness. Chalmers says that the veracity of this 
bridging principle is not something that can be determined via scientific experi-
mentation but rather must be established based on phenomenological or conceptual 
considerations.22 The direct access condition, according to Chalmers, is strongly 
21 Chalmers (2008) and Clark (2009) consider an alternative version of QP2 which invokes the notion 
that consciousness requires ‘high bandwidth’ access to information. Extended consciousness is impossi-
ble according to this line of thought because extended processes involving perception and action provide 
comparatively low-bandwidth access to information. However, as Karina Vold (2015) has contended, 
perception actually relays external information to the brain at a relatively quick rate and so does not qual-
ify as a low bandwidth process. Vold explains that the bandwidth of perception is roughly similar to the 
bandwidth of internal neural mechanisms: “non-neural processes must be constantly reporting informa-
tion back to the brain…at least as quickly as neural processes can operate” (Vold 2015: 21). In light of 
this point from Vold, Chalmers goes on to endorse the direct access condition over the high-bandwidth 
access condition.
22 As Chalmers explains, “Experimental research gives us a lot of information about processing; then we 
bring in the bridging principles to interpret the experimental results, whatever those results may be. They 
are the principles by which we make inferences from facts about processing to facts about consciousness, 
and so they are conceptually prior to the experiments themselves. We cannot actually refine them experi-
mentally (except perhaps by first-person experimentation!), because we have no independent access to 
the independent variable. Instead, these principles will be based on some combination of (1) conceptual 
judgments about what counts as a conscious process, and (2) information gleaned from our first-person 
perspective on our own consciousness” (Chalmers 1998: 3).
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supported by phenomenological reflection, for it introspectively seems as if informa-
tion in the brain is conscious if and only if it is directly accessible to guide different 
behavioral responses like verbal report and motor action. He elaborates:
A correlation between consciousness and global availability (for short) seems to 
fit the first-person evidence—that gleaned from our own conscious experience—
quite well. When information is present in my consciousness, it is generally report-
able, and it can generally be brought to bear in controlling behavior in all sorts of 
ways. I can talk about it, I can point in the general direction of a stimulus, I can press 
bars, and so on. Conversely, when we find information that is directly available in 
this way for report and other aspects of control, it is generally conscious information 
(Chalmers, 1998, p. 5).
Chalmers also emphasizes that the direct access condition is either implicitly or 
explicitly assumed to be true by many prominent neuroscientists and philosophers 
of mind working in the field, for the mechanisms that researchers put forward as 
candidates for the neural correlates of consciousness typically subserve the func-
tional property of global availability. For example, Crick and Koch (1990) famously 
propose that 40-Hz oscillations in the cerebral cortex constitute a neural correlate of 
consciousness because these oscillations play a pivotal role in integrating informa-
tion related to working memory and making it directly accessible for global control. 
Other notable theories of consciousness which endorse the direct access condition 
include (but are not limited to) Bernard Baars’ (1988) Global workspace theory, 
Michael Tye’s (1995) PANIC theory, and Martha Farah’s (1994) High-quality repre-
sentation theory. The fact that the direct access condition is widely adopted among 
empirical consciousness researchers and independently substantiated by phenom-
enological insight lends a high degree of plausibility to the principle, according to 
Chalmers.
After motivating RDE (i.e. QP1) and advocating for the direct access condition 
(i.e. QP2), Chalmers proceeds to explain why the conjunction of these two princi-
ples entails the impossibility of extended consciousness (i.e. QP3). The fundamen-
tal problem is that extended processes cannot supply direct access to information 
for global control because these processes are mediated by perception and action. 
Information can only be made directly available for global governance when located 
in the brain, not in the external environment. This is because information from the 
external environment must pass through multiple subsystems to reach the internal 
control system in the head. Chalmers elaborates: “these processes [cognitive pro-
cesses that are extended via sensorimotor interaction] support information that is 
only indirectly available for global control: in order to be used in control, it must 
travel causal pathways from object to eye, from eye to visual cortex, and from visual 
cortex to the loci of control” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 10). In essence, then, because sen-
sorimotor interaction with the environment is necessary for a conscious mental state 
to count as extended, but such interaction fails to satisfy the direct access condition, 
it follows that extended consciousness is impossible.
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The direct access argument against extended consciousness is philosophically 
and empirically formidable, but it is not foolproof (as Chalmers himself concedes). 
There are three possible ways to object to the argument: (a) reject the direct access 
condition, (b) reject RDE, or (c) reject the idea that mental processes involving 
sensorimotor interaction with the environment cannot support information that is 
directly accessible for global control. The soundness of the direct access argument 
entails the veracity of P2, which is to say, the impossibility of extended conscious-
ness implies that no actual conscious states are extended. However, it is important 
to recognize that the inverse entailment relation does not hold: it does not follow 
from the fact that extended consciousness is possible to the conclusion that some 
actual conscious states are extended. This is an essential point because it means that 
an objection to the direct access argument does not necessarily amount to an objec-
tion to P2. For example, one might reject RDE on the grounds that external circuit 
cases illustrate the possibility of extended consciousness. This objection to the direct 
access argument requires resisting Farkas ‘case against ODE and Chalmers’ conten-
tion that RDE is preferable to ODE. Suppose one assumes that sensorimotor interac-
tion is not necessary for extended cognition (i.e. RDE is false) and further stipulates 
that the brain processes implicated in external circuit cases constitute part of the 
neural correlates of consciousness. It then becomes natural to regard external circuit 
cases as instances of extended consciousness, for it seems that substituting the neu-
ral correlates of consciousness with functionally isomorphic silicon circuits located 
in the outer environment would extend conscious states.
There are at least two problems with this objection. First, it is unclear whether 
consciousness is even preserved in external circuit cases since it is currently 
unknown whether synthetic consciousness is possible. If it turns out that a cogni-
tive system must be composed of carbon substrate in order to instantiate phenom-
enal consciousness, then consciousness will not be sustained when carbon-based 
brain bits are substituted with silicon-based functional duplicates. More to the point 
though, even if it were granted that external circuit cases demonstrate the possibility 
of extended consciousness and thereby undercut the direct access argument, such 
cases would still not compromise P2 given that this premise concerns the actuality 
of extended consciousness. Thus, even if it is possible for consciousness to extend 
into the environment in various high-tech science fiction scenarios (e.g. external cir-
cuit cases), this provides no reason to believe that any currently existing conscious 
states are extended.
The most common strategy for defending the actuality of extended conscious-
ness is to endorse enactivism, a theory of perceptual consciousness championed 
by O’Regan and Noe (2001), Noe (2004). The enactivist conceptualizes percep-
tion as an active process that necessitates sensorimotor interplay with the world.23 
23 Sensorimotor enactivism and the Revised Definition of Extension (RDE) are alike in that they both 
invoke the notion of ‘sensorimotor interaction.’ However, it is important to recognize that the two views 
address fundamentally different things: sensorimotor enactivism is a theory of perceptual experience 
whereas RDE is a theory of extended mentality. Put differently, RDE maintains that sensorimotor inter-
action is necessary for a mental state to count as extended, whereas sensorimotor enactivism claims that 
such interaction is necessary for a perceptual state to be phenomenally conscious.
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The view stands in contrast to internalist accounts of perception, which hold that 
perceptual experience is fundamentally passive and relies solely on the instantia-
tion of internal mental representations. Enactivism sees consciousness as a kind of 
‘doing’, and explains the relationship between the perceiving subject and the world 
in terms of the possession of sensorimotor knowledge.24 Various proponents of the 
enactivism (e.g. Noe, 2004; Ward, 2012, Pepper, forthcoming) avow that the the-
ory entails extended consciousness. The guiding notion is that it follows from the 
thesis that perceptual consciousness implicates active engagement with elements in 
the external environment to the conclusion that these external elements form part of 
the physical substrate that realizes conscious experience. This leads to the following 
possible objection to P2:
Objection 5 (O5) P2 is false because the theory of enactivism is true.
The immediate problem with O5 is that enactivism appears to be at odds with 
the direct access condition for consciousness. As previously discussed, cognitive 
processes involving sensorimotor interaction cannot support information directly 
accessible for global control given that information from the environment must pass 
through two separate processing stages to be used by internal control mechanisms: a 
stage of processing by the perceptual system, and a second stage of processing to be 
globally broadcast. Enactivism is thus arguably false because the direct access con-
dition is true. In response to this rebuttal the enactivist must either reject the direct 
access condition or reject the proposition that enactivism is incompatible with the 
direct access condition. Kiverstein and Kirchhoff (2019) appear to pursue the latter 
strategy in their book Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third 
Wave View.25
24 As Adrian Downey elaborates, “there is a law-like relation between an organism’s movements and 
its visual stimulation— when an organism moves closer to an object the object looms in the visual field, 
when it gets further away the object appears smaller, and so on. On sensorimotor enactivism an organism 
is thought capable of perceiving only when it understands this relation between sensory stimulation and 
movement” (Downey 2017: 2). The relevant sensorimotor knowledge is varied, as each sensory modality 
is subject to its own particular law-like relations.
25 Kiverstein and Kirchhoff observe that Chalmers’ direct access argument against extended conscious-
ness derives from the particular conception of ‘sensorimotor interaction’ at play in the Otto notebook 
case, and specifically, from the role that perception and action play in the retrieval of information from 
the notebook. They agree that this extended mind-based conception of ‘sensorimotor interaction’ is 
incompatible with the direct access condition but allege that the enactivist operates with a more sophis-
ticated version of the concept which is mutually consistent with the direct access condition. The kind of 
sensorimotor interaction pertinent to enactivism, according to Kiverstein and Kirchhoff, involves what 
they call ‘dynamic entanglement’ and ‘unique temporal signature.’ Dynamic entanglement denotes a 
reciprocal causal relationship between the agent’s sensory inputs and her motor outputs, while unique 
temporal signature refers to the idea that brain states must unfold over time to give rise to consciousness, 
and that this temporal unfolding requires environmental causes. They argue that conceptually engineer-
ing these two principles into the enactivist’s understanding of sensorimotor interaction allows the ena-
civist to avoid the direct access concern and infer the existence of extended consciousness.
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The main problem with O5 is that enactivism pertains to perceptual states and 
not propositional attitudes. Even if enactivism is the correct account of percep-
tual experience and entails the actuality of extended consciousness (thereby dis-
proving the direct access argument), the view still does not compromise P2 under 
a proper construal of the premise. The self-stimulating loop argument for P1 con-
cerns extended propositional attitudes; specifically, it holds that OPAs are source 
intentional states that extend into the environment when coupled with external enti-
ties to form a self-stimulating feedback loop. Given this premise, it follows that the 
kinds of conscious mental states pertinent to P2 are OPAs and that objecting to P2 
requires demonstrating that OPAs implicated in loop-related activity are instances of 
extended consciousness. Establishing that the extended consciousness thesis applies 
to some existing class of mental states which are not OPAs does not help the objec-
tor dismantle the extended mind argument against PIT. As long as P1 is true, and 
the relevant OPAs are not instances of extended consciousness, the defender of the 
argument can maintain that PIT leads to the aforementioned contradiction and is 
therefore false. The scope of P2 should therefore be restricted in the following man-
ner such that it only targets conscious propositional attitudes and not all conscious 
mental states:
P2* No conscious propositional attitudes are extended.
This modification of P2 clarifies why an enactivist defense of extended con-
sciousness fails to subvert the premise. The fundamental issue is that enactivism is 
a theory of perceptual consciousness and perceptual states are not types of proposi-
tional attitudes. There are, to be sure, certain versions of representationalism which 
regard perceptual states as propositional attitudes, but enactivism is traditionally put 
forward as a competitor to these representationalist theories of mind and denies that 
perceptual states have propositional content.26 Thus, even if enactivism implies that 
perceptual conscious states are extended, it supplies no reason to think that any con-
scious OPAs extend into the environment.
5  Conclusion
The extended mind argument against PIT is motivated by what I called the ‘bipar-
tite extension intuition’ (i.e. BEI), the claim that some source intentional states 
extend into the environment, but no conscious states do. Put another way, BEI 
holds that the extended mind thesis is true but the extended consciousness the-
sis is false, where ‘the extended mind thesis’ is understood to encompass some 
OPAs and ‘the extended consciousness thesis’ is stipulated to pertain exclu-
sively to OPAs. BEI is inconsistent with PIT because the extended mind thesis 
entails the extended consciousness thesis if PIT is true. This paper has offered 
26 See Crane (2009) for an argument as to why perceptual states do not possess propositional content.
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a philosophical roadmap for how BEI can be justified in a non-question begging 
manner. The spirit of my discussion has not been to prove with certainty that 
the argument against PIT is sound but rather to demonstrate that the argument is 
creditable given certain philosophical assumptions about the nature of conscious-
ness and extended cognition. There are undoubtedly other ways to validate P1 and 
P2 (i.e. BEI) that have not been considered here. It is possible that both Clark’s 
self-stimulating loop argument and Chalmers’ direct access are flawed but that 
P1 and P2 are nevertheless true, for the truth of the premises might be grounded 
in reasons that have nothing to do with the existence of self-stimulating feedback 
loops or the notion that consciousness requires direct access to information for 
global control.
More broadly, I think that instead of drawing upon extended mental states and the 
extended mind literature to argue against PIT, one might alternatively seek to under-
mine PIT by drawing upon collective mental states and the collective intentionality 
literature (e.g. Gilbert, 1989; Pettit, 2003; Tuomela, 1992). Consider how a group 
of scientists can, throughout time, collectively understand some natural phenom-
enon that no individual scientist can understand. This case appears to pick out an 
example of distributed cognition which involves the tokening of a collective mental 
state, namely, a collective attitude of understanding. Moreover, the collective propo-
sitional attitude in question seems to be occurrent rather than dispositional since the 
process of reaching a shared scientific understanding of any natural phenomenon is 
one that actively unfolds over time as empirical experiments are conducted and the 
different stages of the scientific method are completed. If one additionally assumes 
that there is no phenomenally conscious group agent present in this scenario that is 
the bearer of the collective scientific understanding, then the scenario arguably rep-
resents an instance of a non-conscious OPA (i.e. an instance of source intentionality 
in the absence of phenomenal intentionality). The argument from collective inten-
tionality that I am envisioning here is structurally similar to the extended mind argu-
ment against PIT and might be formally devised as follows:
5.1  The collective intentionality argument against PIT
P1 Collective mental states exist.
P2 Some collective mental states are OPAs.
P3 All OPAs possess source intentionality.
C1 Therefore, some collective mental states possess source intentionality.
P4 No collective mental states are phenomenally conscious.
C2 Therefore, some source intentional states lack phenomenal consciousness 
(meaning that PIT is false).
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Determining whether this argument is tenable would mandate a detailed inves-
tigation into the collective intentionality and group agency literature. I raise 
the argument here only to illustrate that the extended mind argument represents 
one species of a more general argumentative strategy against PIT. This general 
argumentative strategy consists in identifying a counterexample to PIT by dem-
onstrating that some class of source intentional states is devoid of phenomenal 
consciousness (and therefore phenomenal intentionality). The extended mind 
argument avers certain extended states (i.e. extended OPAs) represent counter-
examples to PIT, whereas the collective intentionality argument regards certain 
collective states (i.e. collective OPAs) as counterexamples. The key to making 
this general argumentative strategy persuasive is to avoid begging the question 
against PIT. The challenge is to show that there is a class of non-conscious, 
source intentional states without presupposing the falsity of PIT. As discussed 
in sections II and III, the argument presented here does not presuppose the fal-
sity of PIT and so bypasses any question-begging concern. If the extended mind 
argument against PIT is sound, then the prevailing sentiment that intentionality is 
grounded in consciousness is mistaken.
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